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INTRODUCTION 
The lockheed Aircraft Corporation, as a manufacturer of coriunercial air 
transports, is vitally interested ill following the development of air travel 
throughout the world. Rear'onable expectations as to the future developments 
are required as planning inputs for IJ.lckheed' s Corrunercial A;i.r Transport 
Programs. lockheed's air travel forecast requ irements range frOm over,,-ll 
projections of . world traft'ic by major areas for broad market planning to more 
detailed forecasts of individual carriers' city-pair peak traffic to determine 
each airline's aircraft needs. Generalized area forecasts, :['01' example, 
U.S. domestic, transatlant.ic, ;lntra-Europe, serve an the basis for specific 
airline and city-pair forecasts, while the city-pair forec,,-s\,s provide feed-
back to the more generalized area forecasts. 
This discussion will cover .total world traffic an distributed over broad 
major flows. We, at lockheed, usually forecast total world scheduled traffic 
as reported by the International Civil Aviation Organization (leAO). While 
lCAO statistics are available on a r:lobal basis, these show domestic and 
international traffic by couutry of airline registration and do not reveal the 
actual traffic flow. For example, t.raffic between Taipei and Hong KDng 
carried by TWA would show up undc'r U.S., wh.lle passengers ce.rried by Japan 
Air Lines over the same route would show up under Japan. 
lockheed has compiled a twenty~year hintory or the actual world's major air 
traffic flows as a basi£ for forecasting the futur" of world air travel. 
In addition to the bas ic data sourCE'S· (ICAO, I'<TA, EARB, OM, airport ".nd 
civil aviation authorities, immigration and I"ouri~t organization~), individual 
a.irline traffic statistics havE' also been used to htelp allocate traffic over 
spec ific .flows. 
Since the environment within which the airline industry operates is verJ 
dynamic, you can see how essential it is to continuously evaluate aod update 
the various forecast results. In this current npdating of Lockheed's lCAO 
world forecast, our goal was to identify and measure all major air traffic 
flows and still be cons istent with leAO report"d traffic data. 
SUMMARY 
Total World 
Total world scheduled air passenger traffic carried by the airlines of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (IeAO), excluding the USSR, 
increased from 17.4 billion passenger miles in 1950 to 237.4 billion in 1970. 
This represents an average annual growth rate of 11.% during the past two 
decades. The USSR became a member of lCAO in 19TO, and Aeroflot - the only 
Russian airline - reported 49 billion passenger miles for 1970. This traffiC, 
which encompasses both domestic and international travel 8.S well as some non-
scheduled flights, is not included in the lCAO world totals shown in this report. 
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Based on air traffic development over the past two decades and expected changes 
in future air travel service in the many areas of the world, including the 
continUEd expansion of non-scheduled services, world scheduled air traffic will 
grow at a sowewhat .lower rate than in the 1960's. lockheed's forecast of lCAO 
world sched"led revenue passenger miles amounts to 650 billion in 1980; this 
represents' an average annual increase of 10.6% for the 1970 to 1980 period. 
, 
Significant shifts between scheduled and non-scheduled traffic are occurring 
in various traffic categories. While it is difficult to measure non-scheduled 
traffic in many areas of the world, we estimate that it amounted to some 50 
billion passenger miles in 1970,. with about half composed of European inclusive 
tour traffic and transatlantic traffic. Most Of the other traffic is composed 
of U.S. domestic and military charter. 
Assuming the present type of non-scheduled service continues, as well as a 
decrease in militury charter, Lockheed forerasts that non-scheduled passenger 
traffic will grow at an annual rate of 15% durin~ the 1970' s, totalins about 
200 billion passenger miles by 1980. Non-scheduled traffic by scheduled, 
supplemental and charter airlines is expected to increase its share reJative 
to scheduled from 21% in 1970 to 31% by 1980. 
Major Flows 
For the first time, all major world air traffic flows were analyzed, including 
those areas for whjch no systematic traffic statistics are available. 
Actual 1970 traffic has been utilized as a base for those areas regularly 
reporting traffic (lCAO, IATA, EARB, OAA, the U.S. CAB). Estimates have 
been made for all other major traffic flows on the baSis of other available 
data, such as airport and civil aviation authorities, immigration and tourist 
organizations and airlines. 
. 
Lockheed's forecast of world scheduled traffic was developed by preparing 
forecasts for about '48 unique traffic flows; these were then combined into 13 
major flows. Every effort has been made to reflect realistic traffic growth 
patterns for these regions based on their own particular characteristics. 
FORECASTING METHODS AND PHILOSOPHY 
I would like to continue this presentation with a discussion of various 
techniques uSed in forecasting. These techniques are applicable to air 
travel anywhere 'in the world; and, in fact'; most of these techniques are 
applicable to forecasting in general, regardless of whether it is for travel 
or other consumer items. ' 
SlJO 
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Philosophy of Forecasting 
Before discussing the alternative methods of forecastinG, I would like to 
discuss the "philosophy" of forecasting. 'rile 'quest.ion I would like to 
introduce is: Can we forecas lo the future? Can we really know in advance what 
will happen tomorrow, next week, next sumrne,' 01' (,Vell ten or twenty years out? 
furthermore, what can we know about the future? In whs.t detail can we know 
about it, and to what degree of certainty can we foresee the future? 
There are several aspects to cover before g"Vlng my views. First, there is 
the role of the forecaster - whether It be an individual, or a group ,(,r som', 
orGanization that wants knowledge of the future. This plays a ve!7 2 i'iniflca~t 
role, especially in analyzing and predictir.g th8 td",'lior of people as ;.,-,di-
vidua.ls 'or in groups. Since the analyst is part of the ?rocess that is ·~;':?ing 
analyzed, he cannot detach himself from the analytical Pl'O"')ss. This io unlike 
the detachment possible in analyzing and t~fing to predict phySical phenomena, 
such as the movement of stars or the moon, or experimenting under' controlled 
conditions in a laboratory. The biases, the self-interests, the motivation 
of the analyst make it almost impossible to be 100% objective. 
Another important consideration is that a forecast can be self-fulfillinc. 
Once a forecast is made, if the decision-making officials in the various 
organizations that are affected plan on the basis of this forecast, it can 
well be that this forecast will be realized. Forecasts are usually bas"d on 
, certa:ln assumptions of the future; and one of thes" has to be the required 
policies that must be undertaken for a forecast to be realizable. 
When it comes to forecasting any event involving human behavior, I have come 
to the conclusion after many years of involveme'lt In thh; endeavor, that 
the best we can do is predict what can potentially happen i" a broad degree 
under a given set of c:Lrcumstances - a. given set of' assumptions. The greater 
the detail that we would like to know, the creater the probability of being 
wrong in the future. 
For example, if we want to forecast the number of tourists or air travelers 
to certain parts of the world, we must first make certain assumptions relatine 
to the general SOCial, political, economic environment, the climate, that is 
required to make these events potentially happen. Secondly, there must also 
be assumptions regarding specific policies that are required for cert,ain eventG 
to 18.ppen. 
The former set of assumptions which deal with the broader social, political 
conditions are usually beyond the control of anyone airline or anyone single 
government agency. The latter, however, are subject to the control of an 
airline or a governmel1.t agency and something can be done about 'them. 
Therefore, what we ought to strive for are not forecasts, but goals. In other 
words, let us establish what we vant to happen in the future and then determine 
what we must do to make these things happen, r'or instance, an airline might 
determine that it wants to have so many pascn,gers "etween two cities in a 
certain time period. PrOjectIons of the total traffic potential between these 
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points would be made on a basis of the most likely economic conditions that 
would prevail in the time period under consideration. And these assumptions 
would als() need to include fare levels at whi~h this potential demand could 
be realized. 
1~les" factors are USUg lly beyond the control of anyone airline, so a very 
realistic approach must b8 takeL. Nevertheless, given this assumed environment 
the ai.,-line can set Llp realistic goals of traffic that it would like t() achieve 
within this environme'1t. It would have to establish the proper schedules, 
service patterns, advertiSing policies, marketing strategies to achieve this 
potentia,_, so that the coal they would like to have could be realized. 
It may seem that I am taking a very negative attitude with regard to our 
ability to forecast accurately. Howe-/er, I would prefer to be positive in 
streSSing that forecasts disguised as goals can be attained with the reali-
zation as to the extent to which we can control our own destiny. 
llireover, to be able to determin" the impact of our actions on the development 
of future air travel is no easy task. It require" not only analytical insight 
into cause and effect, bu.t the ability to measure these e'i'f'eets with some 
precision. 
Regardless of all the hazards 0[' forecasting - and there are many - we must 
forectist the future. In fact, any 'lecision that is made bas an implied 
forecast ansociated 'with it, ev~'" thuugh no expl:i cit forecast is made. 
I believe, however, that setti:lg up goals enables US to go from the present 
to the future in a mor'~ orderly and. efficient manner. 
Forecas tine Techniques 
I would next like to cover some of the fore~asting techniques. There are about 
as many techn; ques as therEe aT'e forecasters. Since everyone in the world is 
a forecaster, there are Irtillions of f()recasting techniques. However, I l>elieve 
these can be put into u·wut four broe,d groups. 
Trend Analys ~.s . The first method of forecasting is trend analyS is, 
or ",xtrapolating :',,"m t>le past into the future. It can be as simple 
as drawing a li!"~r~ (;:1 e_ piece of graph paper, or it can become more 
corr:r.iicated U~cl;g)-, the use 0:' ccmputerized programs using second 
and third degree relat',onsh"ips. 
Regression Analysis. The next method is regression analysis, in 
"hich we try to a~certain the relationships between a dependent 
variable (the one which you are tryillg to explain or forecast) and 
Independent' variables. In this uppruach broad economIc indicators 
a.nd'serv'ice fact,,!"s have been used to fOl'('cast the rut.ure of air 
t.l'3. ..... el'. Again, ~:hj.;3 method call ]'al1gl' from very simple linear 
reL'ltionship.s Of: til" depellllcnt Variables to one ind,'p"ntient variable 
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to a very complex system of multi-correlation t.echniCl.ues using 
non-linear relationships. However, regardless of how complex 
any regression analysis is, any fOl'm of reO'essi('n analysis is 
basically a very sophisticated form of tl'end analysis. Furthermore, 
regression analysis, or correlation analysis as ;t is ('ften called, 
does not determine cauoe anti effect relatio'lShi],>s. It merely says 
that certain things happen tOGether, and 1'1'0111 that we imply that 
there are cause and effect relationships. 
Market Analysis. A third general type or forecast which is a 
little more sophisticated than regression analysis, I lump under 
the category of market analysis approach, in which detailed socio. 
economic characteristics of the population, its ineome, ag~, 
education and occupation are used to det,c;:'''''m.ir~e trle .: .... ',;.<:,ure ~)a~terns 
of travel. This method attempts to deterr:,:'.r.~ to sece.'" degr~e caus', 
and effect' relationships. It also reCl.uires, h:;weve!', a ~ontiEuir,g 
body of detailed survey data. 
Simulation Analysis. Finally, the fourth group, which I call 
simulation analysis, is an attempt to duplieate mathematically the 
various forces affecting tourism - air travel, or whatever you arc 
trying to forecast. This method is also called econometric 
techniCl.ues, and perhaps it may be a better term, because almost any 
method that we now use does use to some extent n~theu~tical fOl~ulas, 
and so almost any techniCl.ue can be called econometric. 
Evaluation of Alternate TechniCl.ues 
An evaluation of these four methods has been made in terms, of data reCl.uirements, 
advantages and disadvantages and ease of computerization. 
Trend analysis is the simplest. You don't have to have much data. All you need 
is five or ten years of data on the item you are trying to forecast. It is 
very fast and very inexpensive, but it is very subjective. In other words, 
the way you feel today will influence your forecast today. You go home and 
have a good night's sleep and feel rested and come in tomorrow and you might 
feel a little cheerier - the sun is shining, the world is well, and' you look 
at it and say, "Gee, why was l so peSSimistic yesterday?" and you change the 
forecast. Also, it can be readily computerized too if you have a long time 
period of events. 
The regression analysis is a little more sophisticated. A little more detailed 
data is required. In addition to historical data on your dependent variables, 
you also need historical data on your independent variables. Also, you need 
forecasts of your independent variables, and this is Cl.uite difficult to achieve 
sometimes. FbI' example, if you have to forecast traffic related to the Gross 
National Product of a particular country and if that forecast is wrong, 
obviously, even though your relationship may be perfect, your forecast is 
not valid. In fact, this was one of our problems in trying to forecast U.S. 
domestiC traffic last year. Most of our forecasts of U.~. domestic traffic 
are tied to the economic conditions of the country, and our own forecasters 
and the government had difficulty in telling uS when the turnaround was going 
to come. So, when the economic upswing lagged, the traffic forecasts asso-
ciated with it lagged. The problem then is that you have to have good 
forecasts of independent variables. 
The regres£ion method is still subjective in that the years you choose to 
analyze can s ignificaCltly affect the results. If you choose ten years which 
happen to be part of an ups >ling, you would have one kind of result. If you 
broadened your base and included fifteen years in which there were several 
early years of lower growth, you would have a different result. Therefore, 
even in these mathematical techniques, there is a considerable bit of judgment 
as to what data to use and how to use it. 
Again, I would have to point out that here there is no explicit cause and 
effect relationship, though we feel that the factors used are likely candidates. 
We only observe in the past that these various variables reacted to each other 
in certain ways. Cause and effect relationships are not certain. They are 
just implied. 
One good thing about this method is that you can perform some sensitivity 
analysis. If I were unsure of what GNP were going to be in the next five 
years, I could· take two or three different growL)l rates and see the impact 
on my forecast. This way, at least, we have a band of what the probabilities 
of reaching the forecast can be. Finally, computer programs for this technique 
are readily available. In fact, if you buy a computer, they will give you the 
programs with it. 
The market analysis method has tremendous data requirements. Travel survey 
data· are required to get the socio-economic characteristics of travelers and 
non-travelers over a period of time. A nation's population distributed among 
the same characteristics must also be available for the survey periods as well 
as for the future. 
These· data are not always available and are expensive and time consuming to 
obtain. Thus, it can take quite a few months to do a forecast for just one 
area. 
This method does have certein advantages in that the data and analyses can be 
'~sed in dCjtermining marJ.:etiClg strategies and advertising policies. 
Tc my knowledge, this method has 
could be done .relat.ively easily. 
it has not been worth the effort 
not been computerized, although I think it 
Because the data problem is so enormous, 
to computerize this method. 
The simulation technique has not been successfully used to forecast traffic. 
The question is not only one of techniques or computers. It is primarily the 
complexity of the real world and the difficulty in attempting to duplicat.e 
all : he dec is ion-making processes that are involved when people take a t.rip: 
Should they take a trip, or spend their income some other way? Where should 
they go? When? With whom? For how long? Which mode? - ad infinitum. 
This process would also have to 11e followed ce<l.uentially by time perlod, with 
all the lead and lag relationships. As you Ca!1 sec, the simulation method is 
at present way beyond us. 
IJ)CKlIEED FORECAST OF WORLD TRAFFIC 
So much for the discussion of alternate techni<l.ues and the problems related 
to their use. How did we arrive at our world forecast? 
As I mentioned earlier, we analyzed·all major traffic flows through~ut the 
world. In fact, some 48 different flows were analyzed. In my discuss~c-" 
today, I will cover our total \wrld forecast and several vf the major area 
forecasts, including U.S. domestic, transatlantic and intra-Europe. 
Factors Affecting the Development of Air Traffic 1950-1970 
Based On the analyses of past air traffic, we feel that the most important 
factors which influence the growth of air travel are economic conditions, 
price of air travel and the quality of air service. Specific variables 
utilized in our forecasts inc.1ude: 
• World's Economy 
• Standard of Living 
• Price of Air Travel 
• Quality of Air Service 
Constant dollar Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) fOr the ma~or 
nations. 
Constant dollE.r GDP per capita for 
the major nations. 
Revenue per passenger mile, in 
constant U.S. dollE.r prices. 
Average speed, aircraft size and 
fatality rates. 
The rate of growth of the world economies, as measured by various indic~s, 
provides the most important factor affecting the rate of growth of air travel. 
The price of a ticket, especially in relation to other goods and other modes 
of travel, is also an important and easily measurable factor. 
For any given route or market, other factors, such as competitive pressures 
from other modes of travel, are important in deciding whether a traveler 
will fly. For predominantly business markets, various factors which reflect 
how well bUSinesses are doing, such as profitability and rate of product lon, 
are reliable for forecasting. 
Although these quantitative factors are important in developing suitable air 
travel forecasting models, it is important to realize that subjective f'aclors, 
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which may bear heavily on the environment within which the industry operates, 
must also be included. 
During the past two decades, the factors which have had a significant impact 
on air traffic growth have developed quite rapidly. The world's economy, in 
~onstant prices, grew at an annual rate of almost 5% and per capita income 
at 3%. At the same time, markedly improved air service was offered at 
considerably lower fares. 
World Gross Domestic .Produ~t grew at an annual rate of 4.9% between 1950 
and 1960. The 1960's showed an identical annual growth rate increase. 
The U.S. economy grew at an average annual rate of 3.3% from 1950 to 1960 
and 4% from 1960 to 1970. GDP of other major industrialized nations grew 
at a faster rate, with Japan showing a remarkable gro,nh of almost 10% per 
year for these two decades. 
Per capita GDP varies greatly among the world's nations. This measure of 
the standard of living varies widely among the major industrialized nations, 
ranging from almost $3900 for the U.S. to about one-third of this amount for 
Japan. The world average is only $680.00. 
The average fare throughout the world decreased by 9% between 1960 and 1970. 
After adjusting for consumer price level increases, the average fare in. 1960 
constant dollars decreased a substantial 31%, or an average annual decrease 
of 3.6%. Some selective fares, such as on the North Atlantic and the PaCific, 
fell even faster. Comparatively, the 1950's showed general fare level 
increases, although fares held generally steady on a constant dollar basis. 
While the price of an airline ticket decreased substantially, the quality of 
service, as me.asured by the speed, size and comfort of the aircraft, has 
increased with the introduction of jet aircraft. lCAO carriers' average 
seats per aircraft have increased 7% in the 1960's, from 59 to 101 seats. 
Speed increased almost, 60% for the average aircraft mile flown. This trans-
lates into shorter' tr.avel times, especially on the longer segments. Together, 
these t>lO factors - speed and size - result in an aircraft productivity some 2.7 
times greater .in 1970 than in 1960. 
Added comforts and conveniences to the passenger cannot be quantified. 
In general, the kind of service which the carriers have prOVided to the 
passer.gers during the first decade of jet aircraft has improved. In addition, 
,-="ger rar:ge ,jet aircraft have opened new markets for non-stop flights, thus 
reducing total trip time even more. 
Safety, a very important psychological factor in air travel, has also shown 
significaut improvement, as measured by the number of fatalities per 100 
million RPM's. 
In 'summary, during the past two decades, people's incomes have increased at 
a fast rate, while fares have gone dom1 substantially (especially in relation 
to other go.ods) making air travel more attractive. At the same time, the 
quality of service has' improved, as shown by significant reductions in flying 
time, added passenger comforts and a significantly greater number of non-stop 
flights. 
Air travel is dominated by Americans and Europeans. From the subsequent 
discussion of the major factors that influence air travel, th~, is under-
standable since the technologically developed areas of the world account 
for about ~ of world air traffic. These developed areas account for over 
80% of the world's economic activity, as measured by the Gross Domestic 
Product, while accounting for only approximately 30% of the world's 
population. These areas are characterized by industrialization, high 
income levels, a high degree of literacy and urbanization, They include 
most of North America, the temperate part of South America, Europe 
(including the USSR), Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 
The relationship between air travel and population and economic activity 
may be easily illustrated. The illustrations show that the rate. of growth 
of the world economies provide the most important factor affecting the 
rate of growth of air travel. Economic activity of a country, measured 
by Gross National Product, correlates highly with that country's generated 
air traffic. On the other hand, a large population alone is not the basic 
requirement in achieving high airline travel. For example, India, the 
second largest country in terms of population, is substantially smaller 
on the basis of both GNP and air travel. 
The United States, substantially smaller in population than India, is by 
far the largest in terms of both GNP and air travel generated. TheGNP 
of the U.S. accounts for almost one-third of the total ~orld's GNP. U.S. 
domestic air traffic plus U.S. citizens traveling outside of the U.S. 
account for about 55% of the world's air passeng~r miles. 
Forecast of World Air Traffic 1970-1980 
Scheduled world traffic is expected to increase 10.6% per year far the 
1970 to 1980 period, from 237.4 billion passenger miles to 650 billion. 
In 1975 it is expected that 390.0 billion passenger mnes will be flown, 
an average increase of 10.4% per year over the 1970 level. The second 
half of the decade is projected to grow at 10.8% per year, 
Scheduled traffic by the world's airlines during 1970'~ is expected to 
continue at a fast pace under the impetus of a growing world econ~ and 
the introduction of wide-bodied jet aircraft. This rate will be lower 
than experienced in the 1960's, reflecting our assumption of the continued 
expansion of non-scheduled air services. 
World Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expected to reach a.lmost $~ triHion 
(measured in 1964 U.S. dollars) in 1980 compared to th~ 1970 base figure 
of almost $2.5 trillion. Thus, we see that world wide economic growth 
during the 1970's will continue the pattern of th~ 1960's. The major 
change is a partial slowdown in Japan's phenomenal growth; despite this 
slowdown Japan's rate will still be twice the U.S. growth rate. Despite 
growth in other parts of the world U.S. will still be the dOminant econo~ic 
power, as shown in the pie chart comparison. 
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As' a result ef the anticipated expansien ef the Japaneseecenemy, tegether 
with a lew birth rate, Japan's GDP per capita in 1980 will be 40 percent 
greater than that ef W:esternEurepe. Hewever, Japan's GDP per capita will 
exceed,Eurepe's,.equal Australia's but will still be less than 60 percent 
. ef the.U.S.GDP per capita. Averag~ werld GDP will increase 3"/. annually 
frem ¢680 in 1970 to' $912 in 1980 •. 
While service facters will centinue to' impreve, these will be at a lewer 
rate than. during the 1960' s . Pas,senger cemfert will increase; speed will 
net increase sign~ficantly until supersenic aircraft are available fer 
service. The imprevement in technelegy will result in aircraft that are 
better airpert neighbers. The wide-bedy jets will have quieter and cleaner 
e,ngines,.and the increased capacity will amelierate airway andairpert 
ce~estien. 
,Altheugh aircraft preductivity will centinue to' increase, it will net 
·increase at the rate experienced with the initial intreductien ef jet 
aircraft; As ind~rectcests are expected to' increase at a faster rate 
than direct, fares in current prices will net decrease as during the past 
decade. Fares, in censtant prices, hewever, are expected to' decline. The 
fatality rate during the past decade decreased to' an extremely lew level; 
hewever, centinued emphasis will be placed en imprevements in air traffic 
centre.l precedures, airpert landing aids and emergency facilities. 
The biggest unknewn is the future ef nen-scheduled traffic including 
inclusive teur packages. If the scheduled carriers elect to' compete with 
nen-scheduled services by reducing fares en scheduled services, eur 
ferecast will fall shert ef actual future scheduled traffic. If, en the 
ether hand, the scheduled carriers elect to' cempete by substantially 
increasing their charter eperatiens, eur ferecast ef scheduled traffic 
will be teo high as nen-scheduled travel exceeds the ferecast 15% grewth 
rate. 
Censidering these factors, werld airline scheduled traffic will centinue 
to' grow at a semewhat lewer rate than the l3.4"/. experienced during the 
1960's. There'are many pesitive facters that will centribute to' the 
centinued grewth ef air travel threugheut the 1970's. At present, a 
large portien of the adult pepulatien has never flewn. The centinued 
~ncreasein werldwide real inceme per capita, mere leisure time, and 
higher 'leVels of werldwide educatien will spur air travel demand. 
Fleasure travel is expected to' shew the mest rapid grewth in the next 
decade. Increasing GNP and internatienal trade alsO' will previde a 
streng impetus to' air travel among businessmen. In spite ef imprevements 
in' 'c'emmunicatfens, there will continue to' be nO' substitute fer persenal 
meetings and face-te-face' centact in the conduct ef business. Highly 
cemPetitive greund transpertation is net expected in the 1970' s except 
fer Japan. . 
The technalegically underd~veleped areas ef the werld (Africa, Asia 
. (except Japan), Central America and the nen-temperate areas ef Seuth 
America) will increase their share ef the werld' s pepulat.ien during the 
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next decade. Even though economic productivity in the underdeveloped 
areas will be growing at a faster rate than in the developed areas, 
increases on a per capita basis will be smaller. The bulk of the world's 
economic activity, and hence air traffic, will continue to be accounted 
for by North America and Europe, even though air traffic growth rates 
in the less developed areas will be greater. For this reason, only U.S. 
domestic, transatlantic and Intra-European traffic will be discussed in 
detail. 
U.S. Domestic Traffic 
U.S. domestic traffic during the 1960's increased 12.3% with continental 
traffic growing at about 12% and mainland to Alaska and Hawaii growing 
at about 15.5%. This average hides tremendous variations in growth during 
the past two decades. The past 20 years of domestic traffic, may be 











The period between 1950 and 1957 was one of uninterrupted growth ~n pas-
senger traffic. Although there was an actual decline in economic activity 
in 1954, the airlines were unaffected. During this period, fares in 
constant dollars (deflated by the Consumer Price Index) fell 17 percent; 
simultaneously, service improved as represented by a 38 percent increase 
in average air speed. Direct operating costs per available seat mile 
declined, and the trunk carriers actually averaged a rate of return equal 
to or greater than the 10.5 percent standard set by the CAB. 
1957-1961 
The rate of economic growth slowed down during the 1956-1957 per~od, and 
in 1958 GNP actually fell. The result was that, for th~ first time since 
1948, air traffic (in 1958) showed no growth. In addition to the slow_ 
down in the nation's economy, air fares began to increase. Between 1957 
and 1961 the airlines increased air fares 11 percent in order to offset 
rising costs. Costs had increased, despite improved productivity of 
aircraft, due to the greater capacity required to serve the many new routes 
awarded CAB. Load factors fell as the airlines continued to increase seat 
miles, even though traffic growth slowed down. During this period, oper-
ating costs were· fairly constant; but, due to the decline .in the rate of 
traffic increase, the return on investment dropped sharply, reaching a 
low point in 1961 with barely more than a 1 percent return, despite a 
¢ontinuing increase in yields. 
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WUh.the strong upturn ·ih the nation"s 'econorriy, from 1961 onward" traf'fic ' 
grew rapidl:"" achieving about the same "levels of growth as in ,the early 
and mid~-l950's'.,As 'jets became the dominant aircraft,operating effi· ' 
ciencies', increased" better' serv.ice was: offered, and direct operating costs, ' 
per seat mile, ,dropped ,1'6 percent betweeri'1962 and 1968. Air yield, which ;, 
reached a peak in 1962, started to drop rapidly; the passenger tax was 
reduced from 10 percent to 5 percent in 1962. As a result, real fares 
dropped 28 percent. The rate of inflation was less than 2 percent per 
year during this period of rapid growth. The rate of return started 
'climbing, reaching 10 percent by 1964 and exceeding it in 1965 and 1966. 
As airlines' achieved high ROI' s, the CAB increased competition by putting three 
carriers on'most major routes. Between the increased productivity of the jets 
and increasing competitive .scheduling resulting from the new route awards, 
available .seatmiles' doubled in the four years between 1964 and 1968. To 
fill up the seats, the CAB exerted pressure on the airlines to reduce fares, 
espeCially through special discount and promotional fares. These fare 
discounts were probably greater than they should have been; for, while 
direct operating costs per seat mile were falling, indirect costs began to 
increase as airlines improved ground facilities and offered better in flight 
service (movies, improved meals, etc.), and costs associated with congestion 
began to appear. Airline profits and ROI started falling - the latter 
falling to 5.5 percent by 1968, even though traffic was growing rapidly. 
1968-1971 
:', 
The slowdown in domest:ic air traffic from which we have just emerged began 
during thlO,last half of 1969, even though the year ended up 9.2 percent 
ahead of. 1968'~ Newand often excessive route awards (e.g., nine carriers 
serving the U,S. mainland to Hawaii) continued into 1969. Seat miles increased 
16 percent compared to the 10 percent growth in passenger miles. Economic 
activitysl6wed markedly in 1969, and GNP showed only a 2.8 percent increase 
for the year as a whole. GNP, duririg the 4th Quarter of 1969, actually fell 
below the prior quarter for the first time since the 1961-1962 recession. 
Consumer price increases continued to accelerate during the late 1960's, 
reaching,over 5 percent in 1969. Real passenger fares, ending their six-year 
declinir~' trend, : remained constant as fare'increases granted by the CAB ' 
r<Jughlyeq'lalle'd'the;"rate of inflation, Nonetheless, airline profits decreased 
5 pe,tcent,and the ROI slipped under 5 percent. 
Early in 1970 it 'h~ been'anticipated 'that there would be a moderate economic 
recovery'dUiihg the ,"s'eccind h~lf of the year. In actuality, there was no 
re<;~~eri duri'og1970; GNP actually declined. Inflation continued unabated; 
airline, c'osts continued t:o, escahte; real fares increased slightly, and the 
pass<cng<;f'tax wall irwre€lsed, ftom5 to 8 Percent to pay for airport and airways 
improvements.' Airline profits turned into losses. 
, . ." .~ .. ' '. ~ " , 
Domestic'traff:i:h remained virtually static 
carrier traffic actually declined in 1970. 
by strikes of airline personnel as well as 
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during 1970 and 1971. Trunk 
The industry was also plagued 
air tra1'fic ~ontrollers, which 
cost the industry about 1 billion revenue passenger' miles.' In ,fact, traffic 
got worst' during the second half of ,1970, paraU,elinF, the pattern of economic 
actIvity. 
IronicaHy, the 1970-1971 period resembles the ,1958-1961.'period when the first 
ceneration jets were introduced into, service. A slowdown in the economy 
reduced traffic. Capacity increased, not only due to great compet'it~on from 
new route awards but aloo due to increased aircraftprdductivity,.as :a747's 
were introduced into service. One major difference is the current· high level 
01' inflation, a rate of over, 5%. Airline costs Increa»ed at'aneven greater 
rate. Due to reduced traffic growth, the CAB was slow to award further fare 
increases. The airlines, thus,' were squeezed between fa'lling- revenues' and 
soaring costs, resulting 'in their present poor financial condition; 
Forecast 1972-1980 
The economy finally turned around during the latter half of' 1971; Air' traffic 
during the first half of 1971 fell below 1970. Despite the6~ fare increase 
granted in May 1971, summer traffic was about the same and 'traffic' finally 
began increasing during the last quarter. The domestic tra'ffic recovery has 
continued into 1972. The first half is up about 12%; 'and this rate is expected 
to continue the rest of the year. " 
As may be seen from the foregoing analys is, the two most' impOrtant variables 
influencing air traffic are the condition of the nation's econotDy (as m~asured 
by GNP) and the price for air service - passenger yield - measured in average 
revenue (including tax) per passenger mile. ' 
These two independent factors are relatively simpie to'project on a 16ng;-te:rm 
basis - GNP reflects the general trend of the economy and pas,senger yields 
reflect the long-term cost of providing the service." 
", " ... 
However, projecting short-term values for these factors is e<,tremely difficult, 
as to a great extent they reflect Government policy. It"isnext to illlJlossible 
to predict the exact timing of various governmental actions." . 
Nevertheless, our view is that the economy will coptinue improvitlg t,hrot\:gh 1973 
and 1974. Passenger yields will increase to keep' up wiih'inflati"n" ;ihfch is 
expected to .continue through the end of 1973. Air traffic wi,ll c(jntinu~' a 
strong upward trend through 1973 and 1974.' In the last half' of 'the decade 
it is expected that traffic will increase at about 9.5~ per year. ' ,,,0' 
, .;} . , -
Our current forecast was prepared using regression analyses,. ).fany. ;lndep,endent 
variables were considered, including: GNP (iit both "urrent ap.d constant 
dollars), disposable personal income (both current a;i.d.coruitarit,donars )'i. 
population, unemployment trends, current and cops,tant dolIar yields" corporate 
profits, savings rates, stock prices, retail sa'les and, a:,q\!ality se'rvice, index. 
The variables yielding the best fit of the past were current dollar disposable 
personal income, constant dollar yields, <::qrpc::>rate "p:t:0fits and Ul).~J\lPJ,oywent. 
. ,-... .,'" . .' .,'. , . '" ~ .'1. 
,~ , 
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Our forecast through 1980 is based on a 6.9% annual increase in disposable 
income, a 7.~ annual increase in corporate profits, a steadily decreasing 
unemployment rate (e.g.,·5% in 1974,3.8% by 1980) and a yield that remains 
the .S&mE! in constant· dollars. 
Beyond the analysis of past history, there are positive factors which may 
be expected to contribute to the continued growth of air travel in the 
decade of the 1970's. Paramount among these is the real need for such 
Service. Gross National Product will increase by over 50 percent in 
the next ten years. The volume of business resulting from such an increase 
will provide a strong impetus for air travel among businessmen. In spite 
of improvements in communications, there will continue to be no substitute 
for personal meetings and face-to-face contact in the conduct of business. 
The continued increase in acceptance of air travel by the U.S. population 
will be accelerated by larger numbers of young people who have been 
exposed to air travel, either through military service or by youth discount. 
While about 50 percent of the U. S. population has flown commercially today, 
this percentage will continue to increase over the next few years. 
The influence of increased GNP will be more pronounced when viewed from 
a per capita basis. With population growing at about 1 percent per year, 
and GNP in real terms anticipated at 4 percent, one can visualize the 
increase in disposable income which wi~l result. This increased income, 
coupled with the push for more leisure time, will spur air travel demand. 
It is.in the area of increased pleasure travel that the most rapid growth 
in.air travei demand will result. 
Transatlanti.c Traffic 
Transatlantic scheduled air traffic from the U.S. and Canada to Europe 
has been one of the fastest growing travel markets in the world. During 
the 1950's it grew at an average annual rate of over 19%, virtually 
knocking out sea travel. During the 1960's under the impetus of expanded 
jet service which not only decreased travel time but lowered fares 36% 
in constant prices, transatlantic nfr traffic increased at an average 
rate of allllost l~. 
During the ,latter part of the 1960's, charter traffic by both scheduled 
. and supplemental carriers grew rapidly. During the' 1960's charter traffic 
"averaged 3~ annual growth, reaching 26% of the total transatlantic market. 
The combined szheduled and charter market grew at an annual rate of 18% 
almost as high as the 19% experienced by scheduled traffic in the 1950's, 
When the market was first developing. 
Our transatlantic scheduled traffic forecast for 1980 of little over a 
l~.annual growth rate reflects a continuing switch to charter travel. 
Charter traffic, on the other hand, is expected to grow at an annual rate 
of. allllost l~ with the expectation that charter will account for allllost 
39% of total transatlantic air travel by 1980. 
The forecast is based on current types of scheduled and charter services. 
Continued relaxing of restrictive charter policies would result in an 
14 Sq~ 
even faster charter growth rate and in a lower growth rate for scheduled 
traffic. The new combined scheduled/charter traffic would be higher than the 
present 12~ forecast. 
This forecast of scheduled traffic is based on a separate analysis of U.S. 
and European originating traffic. U.S. originatinc traffic was found to be 
related to U.S. consumer expenditures (in constant dollars), total trip cost 
(including hotels, meals, tours and transportation) and charter traffic. 
European originating traffic was found to be related to an index of Western 
Europe GNP (OECD countries) in constant Western European currencies, a weighted 
index of trip costs in constant currencies and charter passengers. 
Our analysis indicates that European originating traffic will grow at a 
substantially higher rate than U.S. originating traffic. Thus, European 
originating traffic which represented 36~ of the total in 1970 will clim"o 
to 45~ by 1980. This should go a long way in moderating the directional 
imbalance that has plagued this market for many years. 
Intra-Europe Traffic 
Traffic within Europe is the third largest world market. The geographic 
definition of Europe is that used by the European Air Research Bureau; tllUjS, 
it includes the entire Mediterranean Basin (i.e., Africa north of the Sahara 
and the Middle East countries). European traffic to the USSR is included, 
but the USSR itself is excluded. Also, it includes both domestic as well as 
international passengers. 
Some 28 billion passenger miles were accommodated during 1970, or almost 12~ 
of ICAO total scheduled passenger miles. During the 1950' s, this traffic 
grew at almost 16% per year. During the 1960's, this traffic grew at only 
12.5% per year. This drop reflects competition from lOW-fare inclusive tour 
charters (IT Charter) that developed rapidly in the United Kingdom, West 
Germany and in the Scandinavian countries. This traffic is holiday travel 
destined to the Mediterranean area, primarily to Spain. 
European IT charter traffic grew from virtually nothing in 1960 to almost 12 
billion passenger miles in 1970, or almost 35% per year; it now represents 
about 47% of intra-Europe international traffic by Western European carriers. 
While charter service has generated new traffic, it has also diverted some 
SCheduled traffic in certain markets. Our estimate is that two-thirds of IT 
traffic was generated and about one-third was diverted from scheduled service. 
Charter traffic is forecast to grow at 15.5% during the decade of the 1970's, 
compared to a 10.5~ growth rate for scheduled traffic. On this baSiS, charter 
traffic will exceed scheduled traffic in the near future. 
It is interesting to speculate what the impact of this kind of service o~ U,S. 
domestic traffic would be if it were encouraged within the U.S. 
15 
other Areas 
Traffic in the three areas - U.S. domestic, intra-Europe and transatlantic -
represents about two-thirds of the world's scheduled traffic and most of the 
werld's charter traffic. 
Other important area markets are the U.S. to the Caribbean, transpacific, 
Europe to the Far East, and within Asia (Japan domestic and intra-Orient) and 
Australia. It would be toe time consuming to go over these in detail at this 
time. If there are any questions relating to traffic in these areas, I will 
be glad to anSWer them. 
ONE IAST THOUGHT 
Let me sum up briefly, giving a few highlights. 
If the future were a simple extension of the past, it would be very easy to 
forecast; if the future were completely different from the past, it would be 
impossible to forecast. Fortunately, the future includes both elements; thus, 
we do have the potential of peering into the future. 
I believe that, in spite of all the hazards involved in forecasting and all 
the negatives that I have given in certain areas of my talk, we can still 
!mow the future in broad terms. However, the future can also be made to our 
liking. I believe We can, by conscious policies, translate goals into 
actuality. We need broad forecasts of the future to give us the framework to 
give us the reference of events that are likely to happen. However, what 
will really happen depends on what we do. We are makers of our own dcotinies. 
I really believe that, and I think that is what planning and forecasting are 
all about. This is to say, you must decide beforehand wlmt you want to do 
and why you want to do it; then use your analysis in order to determine the 
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(1:100" WORLD NON-SCHEDULED AIR -PAS~E~iG~RTRAVEL 
~ 1960-1980 
(Billions of Passenger Miles) 
AVERAGE ANNUAL 
GROWTH RATE (%) 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1960-1970 1970-1980 
EUROPEAN IT 0_6 3_2 11_9 27.0 50_0 34.8 15_5 
TRANSATLANTIC 0_8 2_8 10.5 25_0 50.0 29.5 16_9 
(J1 OTHER NA NA 27_6 53_0 100_0 13_7 
-C TOTAL 
~ .NON-SCHEDULED NA NA 50_0 105.0 200_0 14.9 
ICAO* 237_4 395.0 650.0 13.4 10_6 
NON-SCHEDULED AS 21.1% 26_6% 30.8% 
A%OF ICAO 
SCHEDULED 
* EXCLUDES USSR 
(J ~ ICAO WORLD· AIR PASSENGER TRAVEL ~ DISTRIBUTE~;u~~~'!: .. ~.!i~~~AFFIC FLOWS 
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH 
AIR TRAFFIC FLOWS !I ACTUAL FORECAST Y ACTUAL FORECAST 
1960 1970 1980 1960·1970 1970·1980 
U.S. DOMESTIC 32.6 104.2 255.0 12.3 9.4 
. OTHER NORTH AMERICA DOMESTIC 2.1 6.0 15.5 13.4 10.0 
U.S./CANADA·LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN 4.2 15.9 42.0 14.2 10.2 
NORTH AMERICA - EUROPE 6.9 30.0 80.0 15.8 10.3 
NORTH AMERICA - ASIA/OCEANIA 1.8 10.0 41.0 18.7 15.2 
(n INTRA EUROPE 8.7 28.3 79.0 12.5 10.8 
-0 EUROPE -SOUTH AMERICA 0.8 3.4 9.5 15.7 10.9 
-:J EUROPE - AFRICA 1.2 4.0 8.6 12.8 8.2 
EUROPE - ASIA/OCEANIA 2.8 10.6 32.8 14.2 11.9 
AFRICA 1.2 2.4 6.8 7.2 11.0 
ASIA 2.3 12.5 51.0 17.9 15.1 
OCEANIA 1.8 4.5 13.7 9.6 11.8 
SOUTH AMERICA 2.1 4.8 11.6 8.1 9.2 
OTHER 0.2 0.9 3.5 16.3 14.6 
TOTAL - ABOVE IJS.7 237.5 653.0 10.6 
TOTAL - REPORTED BY ICAO 67.3 237.4 13.4 
* EXCLUDES THE USSR 
!I SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR DEFINITION. 
YSEE AI'YE",DiX FOR DETAILED FORECASTS FOR EACH MAJOR FLOW. 
COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES 
r 
TREND I REGRESSION I MARKET I SIMULATION ANALYSIS ANALYSIS ANALYSIS ANALYSIS 
OATA • HISTORY OF • 7·10 YEARS HISTORICAL OATA • OETAILEO SOCIO ECONOMIC OATA • PRECISE OATA 
NEEDS ITEM TO BE INOEPENOENT & OEPENDENT OF POPULATION & TRAVELERS REQUIREMENTS FOR 
FORECAST VARIABLES 
• DETAILED TRAVEL DATA FOR SPECI FIC TIME PER 100S 
• FORECAST OF INDEPENDENT EACH POPULATION SUB-GROUP 
VARIABLES 
ADVANTAGES 
• FAST • RELATIVELY SIMPLE • ANALYSIS OF WHO DOES AND • "WHAT IF" ANALYSES 
• LITTLE EFFORT MATH CONCEPTS DOES NOT TRAVEL • ONCE COMPUTERIZED 
• QUICK • MARKETING STRATEGY FAIRLY RAPID RESULTS 
• SENSITIVI.TV ANALYSIS 
Dt_MlTAGES • !lOT ANAL.YTICAL • CAUSE & EFFECT • nMECONSIIMING - • TIME CONSUMING TO 
'. 
.·IIIaIE!lTivE UlllCERTAtN • DIFFICULT TO FORECAST FUTURE DEVELOP MODEL 
• YEARS CHOSEN POPULATION CHAIIACTERISTIC • MlALYTICAlLY DIFFICULT 
AFFECTS ANALYSIS IN DETAIL 
• ADVANCED MATHEMATICS 
. 
TERIZATION 
• SIMPlE • MORE COMPLEX BUT • DIFFICULT • EXTERMELY ~ READILY AVAllAIILE • HA.St!IOT BEEN DONE COMP1.EX 
-
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(BILLIONS OF 1964 U.S. DOLLARS) 
WESTERN TOTAL 
YEAR U.S. CANADA EUROPE JAPAN AUSTRALIA WORLD 
1950 389.4 24.8 242.9 22.0 12.3 949.4 
1960 537.2 36.4 389.9 50.5 17.8 1,535.5 
1970 796.0 66.3 598.6 140.0 27.3 2,466.3 
{J7 
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) 
-0 
-0 1950/1960 3.3 3.9 4.8 8.7 3.8 4.9 
1960/1970 4.0 6.2 4.4 10.7 4.4 4.9 
GROSS DOMEsnc PRODUCT PER CAPITA 
t 1964 u;s. OOtlARSl 
WESTERN TOTAL 
YEAR U.S. CANADA EUROPE JAPAN AUSTRALIA WORLD 
1950 2,557 1,810 792 265 1,500 375 
1960 2,973 2,034 1,164 542 1,728 513 
1970 3,879 3,098 1,624 1,353 2,184 680 
~ 
~ AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (%) 
1950/1960 1.5 1.2 3.9 7.4 1.4 3.2 
1960/1970 2.7 4.3 3.4 9.6 2.4 2.9 
ICAO CARRIERS 11 
YEAR CURRENT $ 
1960 6.34 
~ 1965 5.99 
~ 1970 5.75 
1960 TO ·9% 
1970 CHANGE 
AVERAGE FARE LEVELS 
(U.S. CENTS PER PASSENGER MILE) 
IN CURRENT U.S. DOLLARS 
U.S. 





jJ EXCLUDES THE USSR 













ICAO CARRIERS*AIRLINE SERVICE FACTORS AND FARES 
,.,.-ce, .C=~"''''='~;''~:;';:::~~: .~.~c:7: •... ',' ;:1r ,. • .. " "" . '~d;5'tt~:~;<j',tv, .... 7W .':r:}"'~rj;;~;r:~;:!I~t~~?~~:~~~·~'-' '-~7""";T:'~T?? 
,AVERAGE FARES 
, . SIZE' . SPEED .' SAFETY , 'REVENUE (c; ) " 
'. . \ ,-' .. 
SEATS PER MILES PER FATALITIES PER PER PASSENGER MILE 
CURRENT CONSTANT** YEAR AIRCRAFT HOUR ." 100 MILLION RPM'S 
'Q.~~----~----~~-------
~ 1960 59 
~ 1965 86 
1970 __ 101 
"i' .;_ .. -', 
PERCENT . ",'; 
CHANGE 







1.25 6.34¢ 6.15¢ 
.56 5.99¢ 5.45¢ 
.40 5.75¢ .4.26¢ 
. , 
.: . .' .. ~l 
-68% -9% -31% 
**1958 U.S. DOLLARS' 
• • • 
Figure 4 
WORLD GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT GNP BY COUNTRY 1968 
• • • 
• • 
Figure 6 
WORLD" AIRLINE REVENUE PASSENGER M1LES 
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GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(BILLIONS OF 1964 U.S. DOLLARS) 
WESTERN TOTAL 
YEAR U.S. CANADA EUROPE JAPAN AUSTRALIA WORLD 
1970 796.0 66.3 598.6 140.0 27.3 2,466.3 
1975 963.8 85.5 734.0 210.0 34.0 3,124.5 
1980 1,178.0 111.8 904.0 300.0 41.0 3,946.4 
~ 
~ 
-.:J AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES (%) 
1960/1970 4.0 6.2 4.4 10.7 4.4 4.9 
1970/1980 4.0 5.4 4.2 7.9 4.2 4.8 
.-;" 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA 
(U.S. 1964 $) 
WESTERN TOTAL 
YEAR U.S. CANADA EUROPE JAPAN AUSTRALIA WORLD 
1970 3,879 3,098 1,624 1,353 2,184 680 
1975 4,429 3,638 1,921 1,974 2,482 793 
~ 1980 5,069 4,235 2,280 2,727 2,770 912 
~ 
~ AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES (%) 
1960/1970 2.7 4.3 3.4 9.6 2.4 2.9 
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SCHEDULED AND CHARTER PASSENGER MILES 
IBILUONS) 
SCHEDULED CHARTER TOTAL 
ACTUAL 
6.9 .8 7.7 
2.8 
30.0 10.5 40.5 
FORECAST 
49.5 25.0 74.5 
80.0 50.0 130.0 

















SCHEDULED AND I.T. CHARTER 
(BILLIONS) 
PERCENT 
YEAR SCHEDULED1I CHARTER2i TOTAL CHARTER 
ACTUAL 
1960 4.4 .6 5.0 12% 
1965 7.7 3.2 10.9 29% 
1970 13.6 11.9 25.5 47% 
FORECAST 
1975 23 27 50 54% 
1980 37 50 87 57% 









11 SCHEDULED INTRA·CONTINENT INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC 
OF THE WESTERN EUROPE SCHEDULED CARRIERS . 
.11 INCLUSIVE·TOUR INTRA·CONTINENT INTERNATIONAL 
TRAFFIC OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN I.T. CARRIERS. 
